Introduction
The present Constitution of Japan (Nihon koku kenpō) was drafted under military occupation in 1946 and promulgated in 1947; I will refer to this document as 'the postwar constitution'. The document is formally regarded as a revised version of the 1889
Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Dai Nihon Teikoku Kenpō, hereinafter, 'the Meiji constitution', so called because it was issued during the Meiji period, 1868--1912). In fact, however, the content and orientation of the two constitutions are so different that for all practical purposes it makes sense to think of them as separate. This is especially true of their provisions for religion.
The Meiji constitution addressed religion in article 28: "Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief." It is apparent that freedom of belief is limited, and trumped by other "duties," though these are not specified. This article was modeled on European constitutions in the late nineteenth century that commonly placed some restriction on the exercise of religious freedom. The Meiji constitution did not adopt the principle of separation of religion from state. The postwar constitution's provisions on religion are entirely different:
Article 20: Freedom of religion (shinkyō no jiyū) is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the state, nor exercise any political authority. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite, or practice. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity. Article 89: No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of pubic authority. Article 89 serves to clarify separation of religion from state (article 20) by explicitly forbidding public expenditures for religious organizations, religious schools, and charities.
Related to these two main articles, article 14 forbids "discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of …creed," and article 19 prohibits any violation of freedom of thought or conscience. As these clauses make clear, the postwar constitution upholds the principles of religious freedom without restriction and separation of religion from state.
The state may not fund religious activities.
In addition to the constitutional provisions that were in place for religion under the Meiji constitution, related administrative policies also governed religion. For example, since the early 1880s the government of Japan had publicly maintained that Shinto is not a religion. Instead, the bureaucracy in charge of religious affairs promoted Shinto as a public expression of Japanese ethnic identity and loyalty to the throne that all imperial subjects would observe, regardless of their private religious beliefs. The assertion that Shinto belongs to the public realm placed it above the private sphere of religion and included the idea that Shinto is an element of governance providing the rites of state, because it embodies Japan's indigenous tradition.
The bureaucracy promoted Shinto as the source of the ancient rites of state performed by the emperor. These included an annual calendar of palace ritual as well as enthronement rites. Early in the Meiji period, the new government had legitimated itself by making the emperor its chief symbol. The new government distinguished itself from its predecessor, the Tokugawa shogunate that had ruled from 1600 to 1868, by rejecting the shogunate's promotion of Buddhism. The new Meiji government promoted Shinto instead through a variety of draconian policies. One of these was to excise all Buddhist ritual from shrines and the palace, and to revive much of the ancient annual calendar of imperial ritual for the Kami, the deities of Shinto. In addition, the roughly 80,000 Shinto shrines were organized into a unified ranking system and instructed by the bureaucracy to stage ritual mirroring those performed by or for the emperor. The purpose was to create a ritual system that would unify the entire nation in a spirit of reverent support for the emperor and his government. This unification of the shrines under government administration, a common ranking system, their separation from Buddhism, the use of them to promote patriotism, and the institution of a common ritual calendar for them were revolutionary in the history of Shinto, one of the great watersheds in the history of religion in Japan.
Seen in this light, State Shinto was an entirely novel creation, and the view of the Occupation, that the government had misused or twisted Shinto to its own ends had much truth to it. On the other hand, claims for public status and roles in governance based on the performance of state ritual, as well as the claim that Shinto uniquely embodies indigenous tradition, had been made throughout the longer history of Shinto. By contrast, the idea of "religion" as a competing element of the private sphere was novel in the late nineteenth century, and from a Shinto perspective it was consistent to deny the idea that Shinto was one of the religions and hence something that a Japanese subject would be free to reject.
The affirmation by the priesthood of the idea of Shinto as a non--religious phenomenon caused a bitter controversy in the academy. By the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the populace's devotional attitude towards the divinities of Shinto, known as Kami, expressed in prayers, ceremonies, and festivals of Shinto shrines, was widely acknowledged among scholars to be religious, by any definition, whatever the priesthood might claim regarding its performance of state ritual. In the view of scholars outside the shrine priesthood, the fiction of Shinto's non--religious nature had been formulated by bureaucrats intent upon lifting Shinto's state rites relating to the emperor and the nation above the contentious sphere of religious teachings.
Western scholars of Japanese religions in prewar Japan such as Daniel Holtom (1884--1962) 1 adopted a view of Shinto that was highly influential with the Allied Occupation. In his 1943 work, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism: A Study of Present--Day Trends in Japanese Religions, 2 Holtom asserted that Shinto promotes nationalism and militarism. Since the Japanese bureaucrats' fondest hope for Shinto was that it would promote patriotic loyalty, it is not surprising that Holtom came to this conclusion. He was right, though in his concentration on Shinto, his work did not address the equally important fact that all branches of religion in Japan sought to do the same and competed with each other in doing so.
The shrine priesthood flourished under government patronage, and shrine rites became a staple observance of Japanese society as a whole. From 1868 until the Allied Occupation of Japan commenced in 1945, Shinto grew and prospered under bureaucratic supervision based on the idea of Shinto as a public entity with a rightful role in government and as embodying indigenous Japanese tradition. Shinto during this period was so closely allied with the state that it is referred to as "State Shinto." Because Shinto flourished during this era, the priesthood bitterly resented the Occupation's relegation of Shinto to the private sphere of religion and its ejection of Shinto from government after. The official priestly body, the National Association of Shinto Shrines (founded in 1945), seeks in a variety of ways even today to recover Shinto's lost public roles.
Occupation Policies Regarding Shinto
Planning for the Occupation of Japan had begun in late 1943, when the U.S. State Department began to plan post--surrender policies. This body worked intensively, meeting over 200 times by July 1945. 3 The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 dictated the terms of Japan's unconditional surrender and announced that freedom of religion would be established. After the surrender, Shinto leaders were extremely fearful of the Occupation's intentions regarding Shinto. Many believed that the Occupation intended to abolish Shinto completely. According to one popular account, it was rumored at the end of the war that all shrine priests would be executed because of their close connections with the military. 4 The Occupation's initial policies on religion were specified for the Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, on 21 September 1945 in the document "U.S.
Initial Post--Surrender Policy for Japan," which stated, "Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on Occupation. At the same time, it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion," and further, "You will require the Japanese Government to cease financial aid and other support of National Shinto establishments." The State Department group planning for the Occupation sent the "Memorandum:
Freedom of Worship" to the Supreme Commander in October 1945. It called for a prompt declaration of religious freedom but predicted that it would be difficult to implement it with respect to Shinto, "in view of the difficulty of differentiating Shintoism, as a religion, from extreme Nationalism." 8 Pre--surrender planners intended that all Shinto shrines be permitted to continue, and there were no plans to abolish any of the roughly 80,000 shrines, including Yasukuni Shrine, national shrine for the war dead. 9 In fact, the on what would happen at the ceremony. In the end, Dyke and Bunce attended the ceremony, after which they had lunch with the Head Priest. 13 is not a religion. While Bunce undoubtedly was informed of this article, he had already rejected the author's position. 15 Whenever a directive was to be issued, a staff study of it was composed, a document which would explain its necessity and its aims to the Chief of Staff. Staff studies included whatever information would be needed in order to explain the directive to the Supreme Commander, as well as information necessary for the Japanese government to implement the directive. The staff study accompanying the Shinto Directive, dated 3 December 1945, 16 explains, "State Shinto has been used by militarists and ultranationalists in Japan to engender and foster a military spirit among the people and to justify a war of expansion."
While noting that the defeat has considerably undermined Shinto's political potential, the report continues, Shinto will remain a danger until it is completely separated from the state and eliminated from the schools.
The government's misuse of Shinto consisted of inserting it into the schools: "Through the medium of textbooks, highly indoctrinated teachers, and deeply impressive ceremonies, Shinto was made the principal instrument for inculcating submissiveness, loyalty to the state, and unquestioning acceptance of the officials views….Good citizenship was identified with acceptance of Shinto mythology." 17 The report states conclusively that State Shinto was a religion. Though it did not have specific doctrines, it stood for a belief in the superiority of Japan, the emperor, and the Japanese, worship of the emperor as a living god, and the belief that Japan had a mission to rule Asia. 18 State Shinto was called dangerous, inasmuch as the beliefs for which it stood might be revived and used by some future Japanese government to instill sentiments of militarism and imperialism. The problem will be eliminated, however, if State Shinto is removed from the schools and strictly separated from the state. Significantly, the report foresaw no particular problem in the ongoing connections between Shinto and the imperial house.
The report concluded with several specific recommendations for severing the relation between the state and Shinto and for eliminating it from the schools: complete severing of the shrines from public support; treatment of Shinto as a religion; elimination of government control or direction of the shrines, placing Shinto on an equal footing with other religions; elimination of the Shrine Institute (Jingiin), the bureaucratic office created in 1940 to deal with shrine affairs; removal of all Shinto elements from public schools, including nationalist interpretations of the Imperial Rescript on Education; removal of Shinto altars (kamidana) from schools and public offices; and abolition of compulsory school trips to shrines. The report further recommended that the emperor issue a rescript repudiating all notions of Japanese superiority and the idea that Japan has a mission to rule in Asia.
The directive required that the following cease immediately: all use of public funds for Shinto, all propagation and dissemination of militaristic ideology in Shinto-and all religions'-doctrines, practices, rites, and ceremonies, public educational institutions devoted to Shinto or to Shinto priests' training, and any dissemination of Shinto doctrines in schools. Circulation of nationalistic tracts (for example, Kokutai no hongi) was ordered stopped, and the use of terms such as "Greater East Asia War" (dai tōa sensō) and "The Whole World Under One Roof" (hakkō ichiū) were prohibited. Shinto altars (kamidana) and other ritual gear were ordered removed from public buildings of all kinds, especially schools. No person was to be discriminated against because of refusal to profess belief in Shinto or because of refusal to participate in any Shinto ceremony. Public officials were to cease the practice of visiting shrines to report their assumption of office. All religions were to be put "upon exactly the same basis, entitled to precisely the same opportunities and protection." The directive repeatedly forbade "militaristic and ultra--nationalist ideology," which it defined as doctrines of the superiority of the emperor, the Japanese people, and the Japanese islands, as well as any doctrine "which tends to delude the Japanese people into embarking upon wars of aggression or to glorify the use of war as an instrument for the settlement of disputes with other peoples." 19 While the directive became known informally as one exclusively concerned with Shinto, it went some distance toward a wider declaration of separation of religion from state, inasmuch as all religions (Shinto included) were prohibited from "affiliation with the government." It thus had a universal character that went beyond Bunce's mandate regarding Shinto. 20 The Japanese government moved swiftly to comply with the Shinto Directive, issuing orders within days to the prefectures to suspend all the prohibited practices. The
Ministry of Education removed kamidana from the schools and references to religion from their textbooks. Ethics courses were suspended. 21 The Tokyo Imperial University Chair of Shinto was abolished. On 15 March 1946, the Japanese government reported that appropriate consultations at all levels had been held, and public support for Shinto removed from the budget. The Occupation was very satisfied with the Japanese government's compliance with the Shinto Directive. The government and the military were named as the agents behind Shinto's misuse, but without naming names or even a government ministry. Neither the priesthood nor Shinto scholars were singled out for punishment, though some were briefly "purged,"
which is to say required to refrain from public activity for a period of time. specific agency attributed to anybody in the bureaucracy, to the priesthood, or the people, became part of the popular narrative of Shinto's modern history. State Shinto was apparently something that "just happened" to the priests and the people.
How was the Shinto Directive received in Japanese society? Newspaper coverage was minimal and showed most interest in the question whether the emperor would be forced to abdicate or the imperial system eliminated altogether. Certainly there were no protests, but since the directive was issued a mere four months after the surrender, concerns about surviving from one day to the next were still uppermost in everyone's mind. Moreover, Occupation censorship meant that that even if someone had violently disapproved of the Shinto Directive, protest was unlikely.
In the Diet, the Shinto Directive was not even mentioned before 1949, suggesting that legislators did not find it especially problematic. However, especially early in the Occupation, Diet members' commentary on anything related to shrines was remarkably circumspect and brief. This suggests that even if Diet discussion was not subject to censorship (meaning that submission of remarks to Occupation officials in advance for their approval was not required), a sort of self--censorship was practiced.
The Yomiuri newspaper used its 18 December 1945 editorial to declare that the Shinto Directive removed "a veil of mystery" from Shinto, shedding new light on the causes of Japan's deplorable condition. Although there were those in the educated classes who must have doubted Shinto's "mysticism" (shinpisei), no one had the "power" (chikara) to challenge it, from scholars to socialists to the labor unions. This passivity allowed the bureaucrats and the military to twist Shinto into a philosophy of Japan's mission for world domination, leading to war and utter defeat. Now that the veil has been lifted, however, the people should take this as an occasion to rebuild the country and "reform its history,"
beginning with the emperor system, since Shinto has taken the emperor as its head priest. 22 In this editorial as well, it appears that the "veil of mystery" came out of nowhere and descended on Shinto in a way that made it impossible to question. No one was at fault.
The newspaper certainly did not raise the possibility that the media bore any responsibility. Since everyone was equally a victim, there were no perpetrators. Reception of the Shinto Directive by the shrine priesthood was overwhelmingly negative, however, and criticism of it remains a staple of Shinto scholarship even at the beginning of the twenty--first century. While both the Shinto Directive and the staff study that preceded it tacitly absolved the Shinto world of responsibility for its "misuse" and "perversion" by the Japanese government and the military, this apparent absolution left the clear implication that the priesthood had either been incapable of defending the tradition or complicit in its misuse. Jinja shinpō, newspaper of the Association of Shinto Shrines, even now continues critique of the Directive for impugning Shinto's honor and failing to understand how Shinto was itself victimized in its appropriation by the state. Implementation of the Shinto Directive in Japanese society revealed both that the attitudes the directive sought to eradicate were deeply rooted and not easily changed, and also that citizens quickly adopted it as a standard that could assist them in rejecting ongoing coercion to support shrines monetarily. The Occupation received many complaints about violations of the Directive. 23 The complaints took several forms. The Japanese state broadcasting company (Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai) aired one woman's account on a program examining public opinion in August 1946:
We had a festival…last month and as usual. On the day before the festival, several women were sent to the shrine from the neighborhood association to clean the sacred palanquin, to weed the precincts, and to haul fuel on a big cart. While they were doing this, the men sat in the shrine doing nothing but drinking tea, smoking, counting talismans, and making cut papers to be hung in the shrine. This is an ancient custom of the village and no one can protest.
This year on the morning of the day before the festival, a circular written on two sheets of paper came to my house. It listed the names of the heads of the families in the village and gave the responsibilities assigned to each…But this made us angry, and we left it with a laugh. We thought we had been given religious freedom and that there was not reason to submit to such pressure. However, on the afternoon of the festival day the head of the group (the former head of the neighborhood association) came to me and said, "I have come to collect your contribution to the festival. Though you have three families here, none is helping the festival, so you should contribute 300 yen…." When I asked, "Why do we have to make this contribution?" he answered: "To repair the shrine. The shrine needs a large sum of money…."
While the so--called managers of the festival drink until very late at night and bother the neighbors, I have been waiting these six years for my husband's return from abroad. [Presumably he was being held in the USSR]. I have an invalid old father and a brother on public relief. Still worse, my elder sister, who is a war widow, has joined my family with her children. We are able to lead only a very meager life by sewing and making paper bags. How can we contribute 300 yen?"
This was a serious matter for a 'woman's household' like ours, and I was anxious at the time about the money for our rations which were to be issued the next day. So when he said that, I thought of my old father and my poor elder sister with her children and I determined to make a contribution. But I had no money, and there was nothing else to do, so I went to a money--lender. 24 As the woman's complaint makes clear, relatives displaced by the recent war and bombing campaigns piled in together to somehow make a living, however lean. The fact that the speaker's father, brother, sister and the sister's children were living with her led the neighborhood to assess her for three families' contributions to the shrine. It was further galling to her that the women of the community were called out for the backbreaking work of weeding and hauling fuel, while the men spent a leisurely day folding paper and drinking tea, followed by nighttime carousing that disturbed everyone else.
Pressured by the former head of the neighborhood association, however, she decided to make the requested contribution even though she had to take a loan to do it. Why did she go along, when she could have refused? The factor she mentions in closest proximity to the decision is her anxiety about rations. After the defeat, the cities of Japan faced desperate food shortages, and those did not ease substantially until 1949. The neighborhood associations delivered rationed food. The woman speaker seems to have feared that the man pressuring her for a contribution to the shrine might have interfered with the delivery of the rations on which her large household depended. Notably, she fears a representative of the neighborhood association acting on behalf of a shrine, not a shrine priest. In any case, the Shinto Directive was issued to deal with precisely this sort of problem. Every Japanese subject shall have freedom of religious belief and the restrictions necessary to maintain public peace shall be under the provisions of the law. Notation: No protection to other persons than Japanese subjects.
The special privileges that every shrine has ever had shall be abolished. 26 The Matsumoto draft showed evident intent to persist in calling the Japanese people "subjects" of His Majesty rather than citizens, and it clearly expected to continue the limitation on religious freedom by unspecified "restrictions" justified as necessary to maintain public order. No mention was made of separation of religion from state.
Moreover, in denying constitutional protection to non--citizens, the draft abdicated responsibility for the rights of any former colonial subjects who might press a grievance, as well as to other non--Japanese residing in Japan. Its reference to abrogating "special privileges" to Shinto shrines was the least possible bow to the Shinto Directive, which was already in force.
MacArthur, for whom, as Dower notes, "the line between Supreme Commander and Supreme Being was always a fine one," was unwilling to wait to see the full results of Matsumoto's handiwork. Two days later, MacArthur ordered the Government Section of the Occupation to convene a group to draft an independent version within one week. They were to ignore the framework of "revision" to the Meiji constitution and start afresh.
MacArthur charged them to come up with a new constitution that would include clauses in
which Japan would preserve the imperial institution, renounce war, and eliminate militarism and "feudalism."
No one could have been more surprised by this turn of events than the 24 members (16 officers and 8 civilians) of the hastily assembled drafting group, headed by Colonel Charles Kades. While four of them (including Kades) had been attorneys in civilian life, none had experience in constitutional law, though it is worth recalling that Matsumoto had specialized in commercial law before being ordained head drafter of revisions by the Japanese government. Only two had lived in Japan: Harry Emerson Wildes (a civilian with some prewar experience of Japan) 27 and the youngest woman of the group (there were four women in all), Beate Sirota (later, Gordon), born in Vienna but raised in Japan, 28 fluent in the language, and charged to draft the provisions affecting women. The officer primarily responsible for drafting the "civil rights" section was Lieutenant Colonel Pieter Roest (a professor of social science). 29 He and Wildes signed the final document conveying the draft to MacArthur under the section for civil rights; Beate Sirota was also a member of this section but did not sign. 30 The drafters worked in a ballroom in the Dai--Ichi Building in Tokyo, where officers were quartered. They worked in complete secrecy, barring all Japanese from access and locking their papers in a safe each night. The clauses on religion were produced on February 8, 1946 , in consultations between the steering committee and the civil rights section. Evidently the civil rights section had produced a draft (apparently destroyed after the meeting) in which Article XIII dealt with religion. The secret "Steering Committee Minutes -5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12 February 1946" are our sole record of how the postwar constitution's article 20 was born: 31 7. As originally written Article XIII not only guaranteed freedom of religion but expressedly [sic.] forbid all ecclesiastics from political activity of any kind. The Steering Committee questioned both the wisdom and the practicality of the latter provision. Colonel Kades objected that the denial of political activity to ecclesiastics involved the denial to them of freedom of speech and press as well. A special prohibition of this kind has no place in a Constitution, which should be a Bill of Rights, rather than a Bill of Restrictions.
Colonel Roest stated that this Article was designed to prevent the abuse of spiritual authority to political ends. Japan has been a priest--ridden country for generations and political tyranny has been reinforced by the threat of spiritual punishment. It must be made clear to the Japanese that no political authority is attached to any ecclesiastical organization.
Commander Hussey 32 agreed that people are persuaded to political action by the authority of the church, but pointed out that this is a matter of individual conscience, unlikely to be corrected by constitutional provision or statutory law. The further provision that "no religious body will be recognized as such if under the disguise of religion, it should stir up and practice antagonism to other or should weaken instead of strengthen public order and morality" could be used to justify the suppression of any new religious sect because it might disturb the established public order. On the one hand the Drafting Committee forbids ecclesiastical penetration into politics but on the other, it condones State interference with religion. The Article was shortened and amended by the Steering to read as a straight forward [sic.] guarantee of freedom of religion and the separation of church and state. 33 Debate was a strong element in these daily meetings of the steering committee with smaller groups of drafters. Sometimes, dissenting opinions were issued by those who could not be reconciled to the steering committee's decisions. While Roest apparently wanted to keep in place a Japanese law that forbid priests or clerics of any religion from standing for public office, Kades saw a greater harm in the violation of their rights to free speech that would result and wanted to limit prohibitions. Hussey saw a danger in allowing the statein effect-to define religion by withholding recognition from any it might deem harmful to public order. In both these instances it is clear that the steering committee held liberal views and tended to value unrestricted individual liberties more highly than concerns for The Diet discussed the SCAP draft as if it were the work of the Japanese government, eventually adopting it with some changes-all of which had to be approved in secret by SCAP, but none of which concerned religion. The constitution was adopted and formally promulgated to the country by the emperor on November 3. It went into effect on May 3, 1947 . In the interval between the actual drafting and the formal adoption of the constitution, the Diet discussed most of the articles in some detail, especially those dealing with sovereignty, the emperor, war renunciation, and new rights such as woman suffrage.
In searching the digital record of all those deliberations, however, I was not able to locate a single discussion of article 20 or 89. I conclude from this that the legislators either did not find the clauses problematic or that they found so much else so problematic that whatever problems they found with articles 20 and 89 were crowded out. 34 
Status of Religious Law
No issues regarding religious law have been raised in relation to Japan's constitution. Buddhist sects can require adherence to precepts recognized within the sect, but these have no legal force, and I know of no instance in which a Buddhist organization has sought to establish official recognition for these rules. Shinto has no analog to religious law, nor has Japanese Christianity or any of Japan's new religious movements. While a small number of mosques and synagogues exist, Islam and Judaism are practiced almost exclusively by immigrants.
How Has the Japanese Constitution Held Up? While European constitutions have typically been revised multiple times-dozens of times in the case of Germany-the Japanese postwar constitution has never been revised.
While it is widely understood that the constitution was compiled by the Occupation, its emphasis on human rights and general liberality by comparison with the Meiji constitution found widespread acceptance among the Japanese people. Also, the bar for revision is set quite high, requiring a two--thirds majority in both houses of the Diet (article 96). But while the constitution has never actually been revised, constitutional revision has been a permanent feature of post--Occupation politics, mainly for conservatives seeking to exalt the emperor or to alter or excise article 9, in which Japan renounces war. These efforts have consistently been vigorously resisted by the left. The great majority of the people have mainly opposed revision up until around 2000. Survey data now show an almost even split, for and against. Religious groups except for Shinto are mostly opposed to revision, while the Association for Shinto Shrines favors revision. Among some religious groups, article 9, especially, is regarded as a sacred trust that must never be abrogated.
Constitutional Revision and the Clauses on Religion
McArthur notified the Japanese government in January 1947 that it would be appropriate for the Japanese people 'freely to reconsider the constitution' within two years of its promulgation. The Supreme Commander's statement was widely reported in the press, stimulating the compilation of drafts for revision from the political parties and a variety of civil society groups. Discussion of revision presupposed, however, that the democratic principles of the postwar constitution would be retained, and that there would be no returning to anything resembling the Meiji constitution. For that reason, no draconian, anti--democratic drafts were compiled at that time. 35 A 
Contemporary Religious Groups' Opposition to Constitutional Revision
In 2005 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) promulgated its draft for a revised constitution, including recommendations for significantly weakening article 9. Significant changes to article 9 will contravene the commitment to pacifism expressed by virtually all Japanese religions. Article 9 is regarded by new religious movements and Christianity, especially, and in many Buddhist circles as well, as sacred, as an article of faith, and any move to revise it in any form will be taken as an evil assault upon all people of conscience.
The recent proclamation by the Christian group Mukyōkai, founded by Uchimura Kanzō, "The Gospel of Jesus Christ and the Peace Constitution," illustrates this attitude. This document asserts that the constitution is a precious jewel given by God to all humanity, and that it is the will of Jesus to uphold it. 40 The LDP proposes a loosening of the wording of article 20, so that rites and rituals that might derive historically from Buddhism or Shinto, but which have become customary and thus lost religious significance, are not prohibited from being performed and financed by public funds. 41 The intention presumably is to declare constitutional the ground breaking ceremonies and memorial ceremonies widely performed in Japanese cities and towns with the mayor and other elected officials participating. This proposed relaxation of the separation clause implicitly raises the question of the Yasukuni Shrine, but the shrine is not explicitly singled out in any of the LDP's documents thus far.
Since 1945, Japanese religions other than Shinto have mainly resisted attempts to weaken a strict reading of the separation clause. Numerous religious organizations in Japan today were prosecuted before 1945 on charges that their doctrines or practices constituted lèse majesté because they were seen as insulting to the emperor or to Shinto. For these organizations, especially, reassertions that Shinto ritual has some part to play in democratic government will be highly objectionable.
In the LDP's revision, imperial ceremonial at court (kyūchū saishi) would be designated "public" in character, paving the way for underwriting such large--scale rituals as imperial enthronement rites from tax revenues. While imperial rites at court are clearly specified, this new wording raises the question whether any other institutions where the emperor performed "public" rites could acquire a "public" character itself. If "national history and tradition" set the standard, as the annotation has it, then the door is open for renewed attempts to declare the Yasukuni Shrine a public institution or to fund the 20--year rebuilding of the Ise Shrines, as some traditionalists hope. 42 Although it is possible to predict to some extent how the religious world will react to constitutional revision, the spectrum of contemporary Japanese religious organizations incorporates significant diversity of opinion on these issues. Also relevant is the fact that different religions have different histories and styles of involving themselves in civil society and its debates. Shinto has consistently advocated constitutional revision, and we may expect that it will welcome the LDP's proposals, perhaps advocating even more thorough--going changes. In particular, the Association of Shinto Shrines will undoubtedly welcome any change that would enable the Yasukuni Shrine to be given an official status as the withdraw from society may find it difficult to enter civil society discourse on these issues, but it would also be difficult for them to remain credible to their followers if they failed to adopt a position of some kind.
It is not clear that there will be a unified response from the Buddhist sects as such. If they follow their own precedents, they will probably adopt an ostrich approach.
Nevertheless, the several associations of Buddhist groups and the newspapers they publish has become a standard, ruled that no total separation of religion from state is possible, but that activity "whose purpose carries a religious meaning, and whose effect is to support, encourage, encourage, or promote religion, or to oppress or interfere with it" is prohibited.
The standard established is referred to as the "purpose and effect standard" (mokuteki--kōka kijun). By this understanding, there can exist "ceremonies" which are not "religious,"
because some rituals like jichinsai have become more "customary" in nature, weakening their religious meaning.
The Tsu case introduced an important distinction between religious and customary ceremonies that allows local governments to use public funds to conduct rites performed by shrine priests. The case is particularly significant in opening a role for postwar public ceremonies deriving from Shinto and in rekindling ideas about the relevance of Shinto to all Japanese, regardless of their (other) religious beliefs. In political terms, the LDP's proposal for revisions to articles 20 and 89 can be seen as a coded message to its most traditionalist supporters, suggesting the party's willingness to continue the debate over whether state support should be restored to the Yasukuni Shrine.
The voters returned the LDP to power in a landslide victory in December 2012.
Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who previously served as prime minister from 9.26.2007 to 2. 26.2007 , worked tirelessly during his first term to promote constitutional revision. He succeeded in passing a bill that makes possible a popular referendum on constitutional revision, and constitutional revision was part of his re--election platform in 2012. It is his stated intention to promote the issue further during his current term in office.
